Real-time tracking of COVID-19 impacts across Europe reveals that
  seeking "herd immunity" provides no economic benefits by Fezzi, Carlo & Fanghella, Valeria
1 
 
Real-time tracking of COVID-19 impacts across Europe reveals that seeking 
“herd immunity” provides no economic benefits 
 
 
Carlo Fezzi1,2*  and Valeria Fanghella3 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper develops a methodology for tracking in real time the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 
on economic activity by analyzing high-frequency electricity market data. The approach is 
validated by several robustness tests and by contrasting our estimates with the official statistics on 
the recession caused by COVID-19 in different European countries during the first two quarters of 
2020. Compared with the standard indicators, our results are much more chronologically 
disaggregated and up-to-date and, therefore, can inform the current debate on the appropriate 
policy response to the pandemic. Unsurprisingly, we find that nations that experienced the most 
severe initial outbreaks also grappled with the hardest economic recessions. However, we detect 
diffused signs of recovery, with economic activity in most European countries returning to its pre-
pandemic level by August 2020. Furthermore, we show how delaying intervention or pursuing 
“herd immunity” are not successful strategies, since they increase both economic disruption and 
mortality. The most effective short-run strategy to minimize the impact of the pandemic appears 
to be the introduction of early and relatively less stringent non-pharmaceutical interventions. 
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Introduction 
 
In order to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 infections, governments across the world have 
introduced a variety of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), including social-distancing, mass 
testing, mobility restrictions, lockdowns, school closures and businesses shut-downs (1). Given 
the absence of a vaccine or a treatment, these restrictive policies saved lives by reducing the 
contagion and by alleviating the burden on health care systems (2-5). However, they have also 
generated remarkable economic and social disruption. At the time of writing this manuscript, in 
August 2020, the European Union (EU) is gradually reopening its economy after weathering the 
pandemic’s first wave, while the virus is still spreading fast in the Americas, Africa and Asia. At 
the same time, the crucial debate on the extent of the costs and benefits of NPIs and the existing 
trade-offs between slowing the pace of the pandemic (i.e. “flattening the curve”) and reducing 
financial impacts is rampant in both the academic and policy arenas (3–8).  
 
Such discussion needs to be informed by timely evidence on the state of the economy and the 
impacts of the pandemic. Unfortunately, official macroeconomic indicators are insufficient for this 
task, since they are published with a typical 2-3 months delay and with relatively slow frequency. 
This creates a substantial window of uncertainty for policy design and evaluation. For this reason, 
researchers have proposed alternative, high-frequency proxies to track, in almost real-time, 
economic activity. Such indicators provide invaluable information for short-term assessment. The 
most promising measures include consumers’ transactions (9–11), mobility (12, 13), nitrogen 
oxide emissions (13, 14), electricity consumption (13, 15, 16) or mixtures of different indicators 
(17). Each of these variables has advantages and disadvantages. This paper focuses on electricity 
consumption. Electricity use does not come with the highly detailed geographical resolution of 
some of the other indicators (12, 14, 17), but has two main advantages. First, it is arguably the one 
that correlates the most with the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), since all economic activities 
require electricity as an input that is difficult to substitute away from, at least in the short-run. 
Second, it is easily accessible in real-time for most countries across the globe and, therefore, it is 
widely applicable for cross-country comparisons. 
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Several studies interpreted the current reduction in electricity consumption, which in the energy 
economics literature is often referred with the term “load”, as a signal of economic recession (13, 
15, 16). However, correct inference on the impact of the pandemic requires taking into account all 
drivers of electricity consumption, both in the long- (e.g. technological change) and in the short-
run (e.g. temperature, weekly seasonality), so that the estimated effects are not biased by any 
omitted factors. From this perspective, there is not yet an agreement on the appropriate 
methodology. Some studies use as counterfactual (i.e. the value of electricity consumption had the 
pandemic not occurred) the value of load in the same days of the previous years (18, 19), while 
others employ forecasting models (20, 21) or fixed-effect approaches (13, 15, 16, 22, 23). 
Unfortunately, without any formal testing, it is impossible to evaluate the correctness of all the 
different approaches proposed so far. Another gap in this newborn literature is the lack of a 
systematic and validated approach to rescale electricity load changes into GDP impacts. 
 
Given this background, the first contribution of this manuscript is to develop a generalized 
methodology to measure short-run GDP impacts from daily electricity data. A fundamental novelty 
of our approach is that it comes with two companion time-placebo tests to ensure that our estimates 
are not biased by any unobserved factors and, therefore, can be interpreted as the economic impact 
of the pandemic. Furthermore, unlike previous papers, we validate our approach by comparing our 
GDP estimates against the available official statistics. We find an almost perfect 1:1 
correspondence, with an impressive correlation coefficient of 0.98. This result demonstrates the 
reliability of our methodology for assessing the economic effect of the pandemic in real-time. 
 
The second contribution of this paper is the empirical investigation of the economic impacts of the 
first wave of COVID-19 across Europe. We select 12 European countries representing the 
heterogeneous development of the pandemic across the entire continent, in terms of both severity 
of the outbreak and strength and timing of NPIs implementation. This comparison informs the 
debate on the appropriate policy response to COVID-19. In brief, we find that nations that 
experienced the most severe initial outbreaks (e.g. Italy, Spain) also grappled with the hardest 
economic recessions. However, our most recent estimates indicate widespread signs of recovery, 
revealing the temporary nature of this type of economic shock. We detect a sharp drop followed 
by a slow but steady recovery, consistent with a “U-shaped” shock (24). Furthermore, countries 
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that have introduced containment measures earlier in the course of the pandemic (e.g. Denmark, 
Norway) have experienced lower losses, partly because such measures were less stringent. The 
comparison of Sweden, the only EU country where no lockdown was implemented, with the other 
Scandinavian nations reveals that the Swedish economy is currently faring significantly worse than 
those of its neighbors. Therefore, it is simplistic to focus on NPIs such as lockdowns as the main 
cause of the recession. For example, supply-chain disruptions and consumers’ behavioral changes 
impact economic activity regardless of government policies (11). The implementation of early and 
relatively less stringent (or targeted) NPIs appears to minimize the economic impact of the 
pandemic and, at the same time, to save lives. 
 
The impact of the pandemic on electricity consumption 
 
We introduce our results by presenting some illustrative features of electricity consumption and, 
at the same time, provide a first, visual inspection of the impact of COVID-19. For this introduction 
we focus on Belgium, which was one of the European countries severely hit by the pandemic (the 
same results for each of the 12 countries in our analysis are reported in Section 1 of the 
Supplementary Information, S1). In panel A of Figure 1 we display daily electricity consumption 
data. Observing the gray line, which represents load in the first 9 months of 2019, we notice all 
the peculiar characteristics of electricity demand, such as the pronounced weekly seasonality (the 
reduced business activity in the weekends translate into roughly a 20% drop in load) and the 
smoother, annual seasonality, which follows the path of temperature, with peaks in winter when 
heating demand is at the highest. Electricity load in 2020, shown by the black line, follows similar 
patterns. Focusing only on the data before the lockdown, however, we notice how the overall level 
of consumption is somewhat lower than in 2019. This gap can be explained by differences in air 
temperature and/or by the long-run evolution of electricity demand, which, in turn, is affected by 
a variety of factors including economic growth and technological innovation. However, the 
difference between the two series increases significantly around the middle of March, when NPIs 
were introduced to curb the spread of infections. The gap is at its widest during the month of April, 
when the most restrictive measures were in place, and then gradually reduces with the steady re-
opening of the economy in the following weeks. 
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[ Figure 1 about here ] 
 
In panel B, we observe the same time series after they have been pre-filtered in order to adjust for 
differences in temperature, holidays, weekly seasonality and long-run evolutions of demand (see 
Material and Methods, MMs). Now the yearly seasonality is less evident, and two series are much 
closer to each other during the pre-lockdown period, which we interpret as a sign that our pre-
filtering approach functions well. In line with the un-adjusted time series, also in this panel we 
notice the clear reduction in electricity consumption during the lockdown weeks. The gap between 
the two series diminishes alongside the gradual easing of the restrictions. During the first half of 
August, in fact, the 2020 consumption is actually above the 2019 one. 
 
Panel C shows the estimated weekly impact of the pandemic on electricity consumption, which 
we model as a series of fixed-effects parameters (details are in MMs). We do not restrict the 
parameters before the outbreak to be zero but, rather, include them in the model to serve as the 
first in-time placebo tests for our results. Since all the effects before the lockdown are non-
significant, we find no rationale to doubt that our model is able to capture all the peculiar dynamics 
of load. We also run a second in-time placebo test, by applying the same approach to all 52 weeks 
of 2019, which our model also passes (details in MMs and results for all countries in S2.1). These 
two tests reassure us on the interpretability of the coefficients after the outbreak as the impact of 
COVID-19. Regarding such impacts, we estimate a strong and significant reduction in electricity 
consumption, varying between -15% and -10% during the weeks of strictest policies. The 
loosening of the restrictions, which started after the first week of May, prompted a gradual 
resumption of electricity demand. In the last four weeks of our sample (August 2020) electricity 
consumption is not significantly different from what it would have been had the pandemic not 
occurred. Therefore, our findings indicate that the Belgian economy has returned to normality. 
 
From electricity consumption to economic activity 
 
After estimating the effect of COVID-19 on electricity consumption, we derive implied GDP 
impacts (see MMs). Figure 2 validates our approach by comparing our estimates with the official 
and publicly available GDP changes. At the time of writing this manuscript, this information is 
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available for all the countries in our sample for only the 1st and 2nd quarter of 2020, with some 
estimates still being marked as “provisional”. Figure 2 shows how our results are remarkably close 
to the impacts derived from the official statistics. Excluding the provisional values, which we 
represent with a gray color, the correlation between the two estimates is 0.98 (it drops to 0.95 after 
including also the provisional values) and most points are along the 45o line. This comparison 
confirms the validity of our method for inferring GDP changes from electricity data. 
 
[ Figure 2 about here ] 
 
Of course, our estimates are considerably more chronologically disaggregated and up-to-date than 
the official statistics and, therefore, allow us to monitor in real-time the impact of the pandemic. 
Furthermore, our weekly results provide disaggregated information on the evolution of economic 
activity which is hidden in the quarterly statistics. Figure 3 illustrates such findings in detail, 
focusing on four countries. We attempt to represent concisely the whole range of developments of 
the pandemic across Europe, taking into account both the severity of the outbreak and the strength 
of governments’ reactions (results for all countries are in S3). The top-left panel illustrates our 
estimates for Belgium. We observe an initial steep decline and a gradual path of return to normalcy. 
This latter pattern is very encouraging, but it is lost if we only look at the official, quarterly 
information, again highlighting the value of our approach. As shown in S3, all countries that have 
experienced early COVID-19 outbreaks and introduced swift and strict lockdown policies (e.g. 
France, Italy, Spain) show similar dynamics. 
 
[ Figure 3 about here ] 
 
In the top-right corner we represent the impact for Great Britain (GB). GB also experienced a rapid 
increase in COVID-19 cases, but somewhat delayed intervention. In this respect, the speech of the 
British Prime Minister on the 11th of March 2020 was emblematic when he warned the public to 
prepare to “lose loved ones before their time”4. Eventually, the number of infections skyrocketed 
and also Britain adopted strict lockdown policies, enacted from the 26th of March 2020. This delay 
                                                 
4 Prime Minister's statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 12 March 2020, accessible at: https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/ speeches/pm-statement-on-coronavirus-12-march-2020 
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was likely one of the causes of longer British lockdown, at least compared to other European 
countries (British residents were under lockdown for 12 weeks while, for example, in Belgium and 
Italy such restrictions lasted only 8 weeks). Our estimates highlight the steep economic impact of 
COVID-19, which appears to have reduced British GDP between 20% and 30% during the 
lockdown. Fortunately, we start observing signs of recovery in August 2020. 
 
On the bottom panels we represent two countries that in March 2020 were experiencing much 
lower number of COVID-19 cases per capita and, therefore, had more time to prepare their policy 
response to the pandemic: Denmark and Sweden. Most countries in Northern and Eastern Europe 
had similar initially low number of cases. The two countries represented here dealt with COVID-
19 following two very different approaches. Denmark acted quickly and imposed a relatively 
“light” lockdown, e.g. closing schools, large shopping centers and urging people to work from 
home. Sweden, on the other hand, preferred to not enforce any significant restrictions, allowing 
shops, restaurants and most schools to remain open, and simply encouraged social-distancing 
behavior, relying on individual responsibility to curtail the spread of the virus (11, 25). According 
to our estimates, during the lockdown period Denmark experienced a limited reduction in 
economic activity, roughly between 5% and 10% (while on a weekly basis some effects are non-
significant, when aggregated to the monthly level they all become significant, see S3), which 
quickly recovered after the loosening of the restrictions. On the other hand, for Sweden we do not 
detect any significant GDP reduction until the last two weeks of April 2020. However, by the 
beginning of May we estimate a clear and significant drop, which disappears only at the very tail 
end of our data. 
 
These findings reveal that not implementing any lockdown does not shelter a country from the 
adverse economic impacts of COVID-19. Lockdowns can have, of course, significant short-term 
effects on GDP, as the estimates for Belgium and Britain demonstrate. However, the Swedish 
experience indicates that identifying national policies as the sole culprit of economic recession is 
simplistic. Countries do not exist in isolation, and spillover effects have significant repercussions 
for both real and financial markets (26). On the production side, for example, the disruption of 
global supply chains can have tremendous consequences, especially in the manufacturing sector, 
and the general climate of uncertainty generated by the pandemic can depress both financial 
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markets and investments (27). On the demand side, the risk of contracting the virus can reduce 
consumption, in particular among the more at-risk individuals (11). 
 
Comparing economic impacts and health outcomes across countries 
 
Figure 4 combines our estimated economic impacts with mortality information, in order to 
contribute to the debate on the existing trade-offs between financial and public health costs. We do 
not rely on the official infection and mortality rates statistics, since differences in national reporting 
methods invalidate cross-country comparisons (3). Instead, we identify the impact of the pandemic 
by comparing excess deaths in 2020 with the average of the same period in the previous five years 
(3, 28, 29). On the horizontal axis we present the cumulated excess deaths per 100,000 residents 
until the first week of April 2020. Considering that the development of COVID-19 infections 
(including incubation) is about 3-4 weeks, this measure is a proxy for the rate of infected 
individuals in the first week of March 2020, i.e. roughly the time in which COVID-19 was declared 
a pandemic by the World Health Organization (30). This is when European governments realized 
the severity of the problem and started considering introducing widespreads NPIs. In other words, 
it represents the exposure of each country to COVID-19 a priori of any significant national-level 
policy intervention. At the higher end, we find Italy and Spain, where the pandemic developed the 
earliest, while, at the lower end, we observe the Scandinavian countries, which had a more 
fortunate outset. On the vertical axis we present the overall mortality rate of the pandemic so far. 
Not surprisingly, there is a strong and positive relation between the two measures, represented by 
the dashed line: the countries most exposed to the initial outset of the pandemic are also those 
recording the highest total number of deaths per capita. On the other hand of the spectrum, 
countries that introduced NPIs earlier in the course of the pandemic experienced lower mortality 
rates. Economic impacts (represented by the size of the bubbles) indicate a similar trend, with the 
most exposed countries facing the hardest losses. 
 
[ Figure 4 about here ] 
 
This generalized relationship presents two obvious outliers: Sweden and Britain, the only two 
countries that did not enforce lockdowns as soon as infections became widespread in Europe and, 
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at least initially, tried to purse a “herd immunity” strategy (25, 31). Consistent with previous 
findings (2, 11, 25, 32, 33), our graph suggests that the light-touch approach of the Swedish 
government produced a much higher death rate than the one experienced by the other Scandinavian 
countries (despite the comparable health systems) without generating any economic benefit. 
Britain’s initial “keep calm and carry on” strategy and the late decision to purse a lockdown seem 
to have created analogous consequences, with GB currently being the country with both the highest 
mortality rate and the most significant economic recession, despite experiencing an initial COVID-
19 exposure close to the average level and comparable, for example, with that of France and the 
Netherlands. When interpreting these results we need to keep in mind that both the economic and 
public health impacts of the pandemic are driven by the complex interactions of several different 
factors, such as population density (34), behavior (35), weather (36), age (37), health system (38) 
and the structure of the economy (27), which, in turn, do not allow us to draw precise 
counterfactual predictions on specific policies. However, it is highly unlikely that at least a 
significant fraction of the gap between the general European trend and the two “outlier countries” 
is not a direct consequence of their unconventional policy choices. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This work demonstrated that widely available electricity consumption data can be used to track in 
real-time the economic impact of the current pandemic. We developed a new methodology that 
also includes two companion time-placebo tests, which are fundamental to ensure that estimates 
are not affected by omitted variable bias and, therefore, can be interpreted as causal impacts. We 
established a simple and yet effective strategy to translate electricity consumption changes into 
GDP implications, which we validated against official estimates. Since such official indicators are 
only available with a certain delay and in aggregate form, the timeliness provided by our approach 
is essential for short-term policy assessment. Our methodology is not limited to the study of 
COVID-19, but it is applicable to monitor the impact of other types of crises, including financial 
depressions and natural disasters (39). However, an important caveat is that it is only valid to assess 
short-run impacts. In the long-run, in fact, potential demand responses to price changes and 
technological innovation may affect our estimates. Nevertheless, such factors are, most likey, not 
significant over the time horizon in which official indicators are unavailable. Another caveat is that 
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our estimates should be interpreted as the overall impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, rather than 
being tied-up to specific national policies, because of the potential confounding effect of 
behavioral changes (11, 35) and international spillovers (26). 
 
Our comparison of the first wave of COVID-19 across different European countries needs to fully 
acknowledge the substantial differences characterizing their health, social and economic systems, 
which in turn can greatly affect both the financial and public health impacts of the pandemic (27, 
34–38). While being fully aware of such heterogeneity, we can still rely on the different timing 
and intensity of the initial COVID-19 outbreak and related policy responses to draw meaningful 
conclusions. First, the nations that weathered the strongest and earliest outbreaks (e.g. Italy, Spain) 
typically implemented the strictest NPIs and experienced the sharpest economic recessions. 
Nevertheless, in August 2020 we begin to observe widespread signs of recovery, with the GDPs 
of most countries returning to their pre-outbreak levels, consistent with a U-shaped economic 
shock (24). Second, delaying intervention or pursuing “herd immunity” do not appear to be 
successful strategies. The two countries that followed such approaches (respectively Britain and 
Sweden) performed remarkably worse than all the other nations that experienced a similar initial 
exposure to the pandemic, both in terms of financial and mortality outcomes. Therefore, not 
implementing any lockdown does not protect a country from the current economic recession, 
whose causes are more profound, and reside in both supply (e.g. international spillovers) and 
demand (e.g. behavioral changes) shocks. 
 
Expecting a clear trade-off between saving lives and maintaining economic activity creates a false 
dichotomy, since these two goals are inextricably related to each other. The most effective short-
run strategy to minimize the economic impact of the pandemic and, at the same time, reduce the 
spread of the infection, appears to be the introduction of early and relatively less stringent (or 
targeted) NPIs, which can then quickly be relaxed when infection rates return under control. These 
conclusions, however, come with a few important caveats. NPIs impose significant restrictions on 
individual rights and freedom (40), have wide social and psychological impacts (41, 42), promote 
an increase in inequalities (12, 43, 44) and may present other long-run consequences such as 
impacts on human capital which, at the moment, are very difficult to forecast. Our estimates do 
not take into account any of these issues. 
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Material and methods 
 
Data and software. We derive day-ahead electricity market data from the information reported by 
the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) for the period 
between 01-01-2015 and 26-08-2020. Daily weather data is retrieved from the University of 
Dayton archive and the monitoring stations of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration and Weather Underground, depending on availability. Official statistics on GDP 
growth are available from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and from 
national institutes of statistics. Country-level data on the share of electricity consumption of the 
residential sector is provided by the International Energy Agency (IEA). Data on excess deaths 
comes from the European Monitoring of Excess Mortality for Public Health Action (EuroMOMO) 
and The Economist. We derive information on holidays and NPIs implementations from different 
online sources. We run our analyses in R (45). For a detailed description of all the data sources and 
the R packages see S5. 
 
Modeling approach. Our approach generalizes the fixed-effects estimator already implemented 
to measure the impact of the pandemic by comparing electricity consumption in 2020 against 
previous years (15, 16, 22). Our main methodological novelties are 1) the pre-filtering approach 
(46), developed to remove the short- and long-run drivers of electricity demand (such as 
technological innovation and economic development), 2) the two time-placebo tests, xxx that our 
estimates are not affected by omitted variable bias and 3) the validation of our GDP impact 
estimates against official statistics. Finally, we run our analysis after eliminating all weekends from 
the data. This choice reduces the weekly seasonality and allows us to focus on the days in which 
most economic activities are carried on (however, it does not affect our results, as show in the 
robustness tests below). The different steps of our approach, which we repeat separately for each 
country, are detailed as follows. 
 
Pre-filtering: After removing the weekends, we pre-filter electricity load data following a two-
steps approach. In the first step, we control for the impact of temperature, holidays and weekly 
seasonality. Using only the data before the outbreak, i.e. from 01/01/2015 to 03/03/2020 (the latter 
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date is about a week before the start of the lockdown in Italy, the first country in Europe to 
experience the outbreak), we estimate the following model: 
 
(1) 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡 + 𝛿2(𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡 − 𝑘)𝑑𝑘𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑤𝑑𝑤𝑡
4
𝑤=1 + ∑ 𝛽ℎ𝑑ℎ𝑡
6
𝑤=1 + 𝑒𝑡,  
 
where yt is the natural logarithm of electricity load in day t, tempt is the mean daily air temperature, 
k is the threshold at which the relationship between electricity demand and temperature reverts, dkt 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if tempt > k and equal to 0 otherwise, dwt are four dummy variables 
identifying the day of the week (with Monday as baseline), dht are six dummy variables identifying 
six different types of public holidays effects (generic public holidays, gap day between a holiday 
and a Sunday, gap day between a holiday and a Saturday, Christmas, New Year’s Day, 31st of 
December) and et is the error component. We chose k by visually inspecting the data in each 
country (typically 60oF). After estimating this model via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) we obtain 
adjusted electricity load as: ?̇?𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡, where the “hat” accent indicates the prediction from 
equation (1). This measure of electricity load can be thought as the fraction of consumption 
independent from temperature, weekly seasonality and holidays. In the second step of our pre-
filtering approach we control for the energy efficiency and the general level of economic activity 
in different years by estimating yearly fixed effects. Such fixed effects cannot be estimated on the 
entire dataset, since the fixed effect for year 2020 would capture also the average impact of the 
pandemic. Therefore, for each year we consider only the data corresponding to the period before 
the outbreak, i.e. from the 01/01 to the 03/03 (this corresponds to 56 days in each year for a total 
of 336 observations) and specify the following model: 
 
(2) ?̇?𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑑𝑖
5
𝑖=1 + 𝑣𝑡 ,  
 
where di are 5 dummy variables for the years 2015-2019 (with 2020 as the base year), vi is the 
error component and 0, ..., 5 are the fixed-effect parameters that we estimate via OLS. We then 
subtract to ?̇?𝑡 the appropriate fixed effect in each year, obtaining our electricity load time series 
adjusted for temperature, weekly seasonality, holidays and yearly fixed-effects, which we indicate 
with ?̈?𝑡. This is the dependent variable in the rest of our analysis. 
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Electricity load modeling. We employ two different types of fixed effects in order to capture the 
remaining features of electricity consumption dynamics and, therefore, to isolate the causal impact 
of COVID-19. The model can be written as: 
 
(3) ?̈?𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡,2020
∗ + 𝑢𝑡 , 
 
where ?̈?𝑡 is the natural logarithm of electricity load after the two-steps pre-filtering process, t are 
week-of-the-year fixed effects, t,2020 are week-of-the-year fixed effects interacted with a dummy 
variable identifying year 2020, and ut is the random component, which we specify as an 
autoregressive model of order one, AR(1), to capture residual autocorrelation (16). The resulting 
specification can be estimated via maximum likelihood. The week-of-the-year fixed effects t 
encompass the slow-moving yearly seasonality connected to the remaining effect of weather, 
daylight hours and cultural habits, such as the reduction in economic activity during the summer 
and winter. The coefficients of interests are the t2020: they measure the differences in electricity 
consumption between each week of year 2020 and the average of the corresponding week in the 
previous five years which cannot be explained by any of the other observed factors. We expect 
these coefficients to be negative and significant when the NPIs and the general crisis generated by 
the pandemic start affecting economic activities. On the other hand, if the model is correctly 
specified, the w,2020 coefficients corresponding to the weeks before the outbreak should be not 
significantly different from zero. This consideration allows us to design two in-time placebo tests. 
To carry out the first one, we simply include in the model the w,2020 corresponding to the weeks 
before the outbreak. If our approach is successful in capturing all the peculiar features of electricity 
consumption, these parameters should be non-significantly different from zero. In the second test 
we eliminate year 2020 and run the entire analysis as if the pandemic happened in year 2019. 
Again, in order to pass this test, the weekly effects corresponding to year 2019 should be non-
significantly different from zero. We report these results in S2.1.  Lastly, similarly to (13, 15, 16, 
22, 23), this model does not include any electricity price effect, since short-run electricity demand 
elasticity can be considered as perfectly inelastic (47, 48). 
 
Electricity load impact estimation. In order to estimate the impact of the pandemic on electricity 
consumption we compare daily in-sample predictions for year 2020 obtained by a) the full model 
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in Eq. 3 and b) the same model in which all the w,2020 parameters are set to zero. While the former 
predictions represent our best-fitting estimates, the second one corresponds to the value that, 
according to our model, electricity consumption would have had if the pandemic had not happened, 
i.e. if the pattern of pre-filtered electricity consumption would have followed the same dynamics 
of the previous years. Indicating these two predictions (on the original scale of the variable) 
respectively with ?̂?𝑡 and ?̂?𝑡
∗, we can write the percentage impact of COVID-19 on electricity load 
as: 
 
(4) 𝑙𝑡 = 100(?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡
∗)/ ?̂?𝑡
∗ ,  
 
and derive appropriate confidence intervals running 5000 Monte Carlo simulations from the 
estimated joint distribution of the model’s parameters.5 
 
Economic impact estimation. Following findings in the recent literature (13, 15, 16) and our 
analysis of the electricity consumption reduction associated to the financial crisis of the years 
2008-09 (see S4), we employ some deliberately simple assumptions to transform our estimates of 
electricity load changes into economic impacts. We assume that, in each country, GDP changes are 
proportional to the changes in electricity consumption by all productive sectors, i.e. all sectors but 
the residential one. Therefore, we rescale our estimates in Eq. 4, which are calculated on total 
electricity consumption, as follows. During regular days (i.e. no lockdown) we simply assume that 
residential consumption has remained unaffected and, therefore, all the reduction in electricity load 
due to the pandemic can be traced back to the other sectors. The resulting impact on GDP 
corresponds to: GDPnl,t = lt 100 / (100 – r), where r represents the percentage of consumption of 
the residential sector for the relevant country. During lockdown days, we follow IEA estimates 
(49) reporting that residential consumption has increased by 40% when such restrictions were in 
place, and rescale our calculations accordingly: GDPl,t = lt 100 / (100 – 1.4r). The lockdown dates 
for each country are in S5.3. Figure 2 in the manuscript shows how our approach provides results 
that are remarkably close to the official estimates of the GDP changes during the first two quarters 
                                                 
5 Because of Jensen’s inequality, the prediction on the original variable scale are not simply the exponent of the 
prediction on the log, but actually depend on the distribution of the random component (50). Since, in our case, the 
difference is negligible because of the low noise-vs-signal ratio, for simplicity we employ the Gaussian distribution 
i.e. Yt = exp[yt + (s2/2)], with s indicating the estimated standard deviation of the error component. 
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of 2020. Importantly, the official indicators report GDP changes, and not the GDP impact of the 
pandemic. Therefore, for an appropriate comparison with our estimates, we need to subtract, from 
the official statistics, the GDP change that would have happened if the pandemic had not occurred. 
For simplicity we use assume this counterfactual to be the change in the corresponding quarter of 
2019.6 
 
Robustness tests. Apart from the two time-placebo tests illustrated previously, we also evaluate 
the robustness of our findings by 1) estimating the model using OLS, 2) analyzing all days 
including weekends and 3) focusing on peak time, i.e. daily data obtained aggregating only the 
hourly data from 8am to 6pm). Results remain stable in all these different specifications (S2.2).  
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1: Electricity time series and COVID-19 impact for Belgium 
 
 
Notes: plot A presents the original electricity consumption time-series, plot B presents the same time-series 
after prefiltering and plot C presents the estimated impacts of electricity consumption, with the vertical lines 
indicating 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 2: Relationship between our estimates and official statistics 
 
 
Notes: Dots represent estimates for the 2020 Q1 and squares for 2020 Q2. In gray we plot estimates 
that are indicated as “provisional” in the OECD database. The correlation coefficient  is calculated 
excluding these provisional data. Including such provisional data, it drops to 0.95. 
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Figure 3: Estimated impact of COVID-19 on GDP 
 
 
Notes: The plots present weekly GDP impacts, with the vertical lines indicating the 95% confidence intervals. In different countries lockdowns were 
implemented and then gradually lifted following different strategies. To allow comparisons, here we indicate as “lockdown ends” the date in which all 
retail shops are reopened (dates for all countries are in S5.3).
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Figure 4: Public health and economic impacts of COVID-19 
 
 
Notes: Excess deaths calculated as the difference between the cumulated total deaths per 100,000 
residents of each week of 2020 and the average cumulated deaths for the same week in the years 
2015-2019. Week 14 corresponding to the first week of April and week 26 corresponding to the last 
week of June. The size of the balloons represents the overall GDP reduction estimated by our model 
until August 2020. Dashed line represent the best fitting local linear regression via non-parametric 
estimation. 
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S1: Electricity time series plots and impacts 
 
Here we replicate Figure 1 for all the countries included in our analysis. The top panel presents the 
original electricity consumption time-series, the middle panel presents the same time-series after 
prefiltering and the bottom panel presents the estimated impacts of electricity consumption, with 
the vertical lines indicating 95% confidence intervals. 
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S2: Robustness tests 
 
In this section we report the results from our robustness tests. 
 
S2.1 In-time placebo tests 
 
The two in-time placebo tests consist in evaluating the coefficients of the interaction term between 
year and weekly fixed-effects during time periods in which we do not have any reason to expect 
significant effects. In the in-time-placebo test 1, we test the significance of the coefficients of 2020 
before the outbreak (weeks 1-8) and in the in-time-placebo test 2 we eliminate the data for 2020 
and run the analysis for year 2019, i.e. we test the significance of all interaction effects between 
the weekly-fixed effect and a dummy for year 2019. In order to pass these two tests, all the 
coefficients should be non-significantly different from zero, with the exception of a few “false 
positives” compatible with type-I errors at the given significance level. Table S1 reports the results 
for all the countries in our analysis. 
 
Table S1: In-time placebo tests 
Country 
In-time placebo 1 In-time-placebo 2 
5% 10% 5% 10% 
Austria 0 0 0 1 
Belgium 0 0 3 5 
Denmark 1 1 0 1 
France 1 1 4 5 
Germany 0 0 18 23 
Italy  0 0 9 10 
Netherlands 0 0 2 8 
Norway 0 0 3 6 
Spain 0 0 5 6 
Sweden 0 0 2 4 
Switzerland 0 0 3 10 
United Kingdom 0 0 1 2 
     
Average 0.2 0.2 2.9 5.2 
Expected type I error 0.5 0.9 2.6 5.2 
Notes: the table reports number of tests failed in each country at each significance level. Average calculated by 
excluding Germany, expected type I error is the number of failed test compatible with the significance level. 
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All countries pass the first in-time placebo test with flying colors. Regarding the second test, all 
countries except Germany and, to a lesser extent, Italy, have a number of failed test compatible 
with the significance levels. After excluding Germany, the average number of failed tests is in line 
with the expected number of type-I errors (results reported in the last two rows). Despite Germany 
failing to pass this second test, our estimated GDP impacts are very close to the official indicators 
for the first two quarters of 2020 (see Figure 2 in the main paper), indicating that our 
misspecification is likely to be not very severe. Overall, the results for all other nations appears to 
be very robust. This analysis also shows how our tests perform well and are able to identify even 
small miss-specifications. 
 
S2.2 Alternative data definition and estimators  
 
In our main model we calculated daily electricity load by averaging all hourly (or intra-hourly) 
information of each day, we excluded weekends and estimated our model via maximum likelihood 
to allow the error term to have an AR(1) component. Here, we compare the estimated electricity 
load impacts in our main specification with three alternatives: 1) considering all days, including 
weekends, 2) estimating the main model with OLS, 3) focusing only on weekday peak hours, i.e. 
hours between 8am and 6pm,. In order to preserve space, we present results only for the four 
countries included in Figure 3, i.e. Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain and Sweden. In general, 
confidence intervals from considering all days are slightly smaller because the fixed effect 
parameters are estimated on 7 observations instead of 5. Also the OLS estimator generates smaller 
confidence intervals, since it does not take into account of any residual autocorrelation. Finally, 
using peak-only hours estimates a somewhat more intense reduction during the lockdown, since 
the peak represents the moment when working activities consume the highest percentage of 
electricity consumption. Despite these differences, the three alternative specification generate 
results that are consistent with those provided by our main model. 
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Figure S1: Alternative specifications for Belgium 
 
Notes: the plots compares the estimated impact of COVID-19 on electricity consumption according to our base 
model and three alternative specifications: “all days” = including weekdays and weekends, “OLS” = estimating 
the model with OLS instead of ML, “peak only” = estimating the model using only peak hourly data, i.e. from 
8am to 6pm). Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure S2: Alternative specifications for Great Britain 
 
Notes: the plots compares the estimated impact of COVID-19 on electricity consumption according to our base 
model and three alternative specifications: “all days” = including weekdays and weekends, “OLS” = estimating 
the model with OLS instead of ML, “peak only” = estimating the model using only peak hourly data, i.e. from 
8am to 6pm). Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure S3: Alternative specifications for Denmark 
 
Notes: the plots compares the estimated impact of COVID-19 on electricity consumption according to our base 
model and three alternative specifications: “all days” = including weekdays and weekends, “OLS” = estimating 
the model with OLS instead of ML, “peak only” = estimating the model using only peak hourly data, i.e. from 
8am to 6pm). Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure S4: Alternative specifications for Sweden 
 
Notes: the plots compares the estimated impact of COVID-19 on electricity consumption according to our base 
model and three alternative specifications: “all days” = including weekdays and weekends, “OLS” = estimating 
the model with OLS instead of ML, “peak only” = estimating the model using only peak hourly data, i.e. from 
8am to 6pm). Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
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S3: Estimated GDP impacts  
 
Austria 
 
Monthly GDP impacts 
 
Month GDP impact Lower bound Upper bound Significance 
March -9.29 -12.36 -6.17 *** 
April -16.27 -19.5 -13.07 *** 
May -9.47 -12.34 -6.58 *** 
June -13.01 -15.78 -10.2 *** 
July -7.17 -10.05 -4.29 *** 
August -6.21 -9.55 -2.84 *** 
Notes: lower and upper bounds indicate 95% confidence intervals obtained with 5000 Monte 
Carlo repetitions. Stars indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.  
 
Weekly GDP impacts plot
 
Notes: vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
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Belgium 
 
Monthly GDP impacts 
 
Month GDP impact Lower bound Upper bound Significance 
March -8.53 -11.44 -5.55 *** 
April -16.53 -19.42 -13.63 *** 
May -9.18 -11.97 -6.33 *** 
June -4.52 -7.33 -1.55 *** 
July -2.64 -5.44  0.14 * 
August  0.99 -2.4  4.31  
Notes: lower and upper bounds indicate 95% confidence intervals obtained with 5000 Monte 
Carlo repetitions. Stars indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.  
 
 
Weekly GDP impacts plot 
 
Notes: vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
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Denmark  
 
Monthly GDP impacts 
 
Month GDP impact Lower bound Upper bound Significance 
March -5.73 -10.56 -0.91 ** 
April -5.82 -11.35 -0.16 ** 
May -5.58 -10.37 -0.69 ** 
June -3.11 -7.74  1.61  
July -2.85 -7.29  1.64  
August  0.41 -4.8  6.02  
Notes: lower and upper bounds indicate 95% confidence intervals obtained with 5000 Monte 
Carlo repetitions. Stars indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.  
 
 
Weekly GDP impacts plot 
 
Notes: vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
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France 
 
Monthly GDP impacts 
 
Month GDP impact Lower bound Upper bound Significance 
March -12.91 -19.54 -6.31 *** 
April -26.1 -33.45 -19.16 *** 
May -18.88 -24.91 -12.56 *** 
June -15.48 -21.04 -9.58 *** 
July -7.47 -13.4 -1.52 ** 
August -1.52 -8.52  5.8  
Notes: lower and upper bounds indicate 95% confidence intervals obtained with 5000 Monte 
Carlo repetitions. Stars indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.  
 
 
Weekly GDP impacts plot 
 
Notes: vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
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Germany 
 
Monthly GDP impacts 
 
Month GDP impact Lower bound Upper bound Significance 
March -6.53 -9.29 -3.66 *** 
April -15.33 -18.06 -12.53 *** 
May -14.18 -16.65 -11.65 *** 
June -12.11 -14.56 -9.62 *** 
July -11.94 -14.31 -9.44 *** 
August -6.66 -9.56 -3.72 *** 
Notes: lower and upper bounds indicate 95% confidence intervals obtained with 5000 Monte 
Carlo repetitions. Stars indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.  
 
 
Weekly GDP impacts plot 
 
Notes: vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
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Great Britain 
 
Monthly GDP impacts 
 
Month GDP impact Lower bound Upper bound Significance 
March -5.3 -10.38 -0.36 ** 
April -27.33 -32.68 -21.88 *** 
May -21.28 -26.63 -15.64 *** 
June -22.62 -27.4 -17.69 *** 
July -22.38 -26.53 -18.31 *** 
August -8.04 -13.22 -2.79 *** 
Notes: lower and upper bounds indicate 95% confidence intervals obtained with 5000 Monte 
Carlo repetitions. Stars indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.  
 
 
Weekly GDP impacts plot 
 
Notes: vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
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Italy 
 
Monthly GDP impacts 
 
Month GDP impact Lower bound Upper bound Significance 
March -18.73 -22.04 -15.19 *** 
April -30.25 -33.42 -27.01 *** 
May -13.99 -17.16 -10.74 *** 
June -11.42 -14.65 -8.18 *** 
July -6.08 -9.29 -2.8 *** 
August 3.93 -0.17  8.04  
Notes: lower and upper bounds indicate 95% confidence intervals obtained with 5000 Monte 
Carlo repetitions. Stars indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.  
 
 
Weekly GDP impacts plot 
 
Notes: vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
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Netherlands 
 
Monthly GDP impacts 
 
Month GDP impact Lower bound Upper bound Significance 
March -9.19 -12.31 -5.93 *** 
April -14.34 -17.49 -11.16 *** 
May -14.01 -16.99 -10.95 *** 
June -11.16 -14.11 -8.13 *** 
July -9.04 -11.93 -6.2 *** 
August  2.29 -1.35  5.97  
Notes: lower and upper bounds indicate 95% confidence intervals obtained with 5000 Monte 
Carlo repetitions. Stars indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.  
 
 
Weekly GDP impacts plot 
 
Notes: vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
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Norway 
 
Monthly GDP impacts 
 
Month GDP impact Lower bound Upper bound Significance 
March -4.03 -10.35  2.42  
April -4.51 -11.02  2.53  
May -8.38 -13.76 -2.75 *** 
June -7.57 -12.65 -2.40 *** 
July -8.81 -13.87 -3.57 *** 
August -3.60 -9.43  2.38  
Notes: lower and upper bounds indicate 95% confidence intervals obtained with 5000 Monte 
Carlo repetitions. Stars indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.  
 
 
Weekly GDP impacts plot 
 
Notes: vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
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Spain 
 
Monthly GDP impacts 
 
Month GDP impact Lower bound Upper bound Significance 
March -8.17 -11.41 -4.86 *** 
April -25.9 -29.00 -22.55 *** 
May -17.3 -20.19 -14.39 *** 
June -11.5 -14.28 -8.84 *** 
July -4.36 -7.32 -1.39 ** 
August -1.35 -4.72  2.05  
Notes: lower and upper bounds indicate 95% confidence intervals obtained with 5000 Monte 
Carlo repetitions. Stars indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.  
 
 
Weekly GDP impacts plot 
 
Notes: vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
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Sweden 
 
Monthly GDP impacts 
 
Month GDP impact Lower bound Upper bound Significance 
March -0.38 -4.94  4.36  
April -5.34 -9.72 -0.84 ** 
May -13.83 -17.88 -9.46 *** 
June -7.73 -12.03 -3.41 *** 
July -12.25 -16.46 -7.94 *** 
August -3.86 -8.96  1.28  
Notes: lower and upper bounds indicate 95% confidence intervals obtained with 5000 Monte 
Carlo repetitions. Stars indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.  
 
 
Weekly GDP impacts plot 
 
Notes: vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
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Switzerland 
 
Monthly GDP impacts 
 
Month GDP impact Lower bound Upper bound Significance 
March -7.00 -12.5 -1.27 *** 
April -13.16 -19.24 -6.87 *** 
May -13.05 -18.35 -7.69 *** 
June -14.00 -18.58 -9.24 *** 
July -9.67 -14.64 -4.85 *** 
August -4.8 -10.52  0.97  
Notes: lower and upper bounds indicate 95% confidence intervals obtained with 5000 Monte 
Carlo repetitions. Stars indicate significance as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.  
 
 
Weekly GDP impacts plot 
 
Notes: vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
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S4: Electricity and GDP during the great recession 
 
The sudden recession followed by a significant expansion in the years 2008-10 provides a great 
illustrative example for presenting the short-run relationship between electricity consumption and 
economic activity. Figure S5 reports the scatter plot between percentage change in electricity 
consumption and GDP between years 2008 and 2009 (the recession) and years 2009 and 2010 (the 
recovery) for the countries included in our main analysis, to which we also added United States, 
Canada, China, Russia and Australia in order to present a more complete picture. The relationship 
between the two variables is very strong, with a correlation coefficient of 0.91. Therefore, 
assuming a strong and linear short-run relation between electricity consumption and GDP is 
realistic and empirically grounded. 
 
Figure S5: Relationship between GDP change and electricity consumption change 
 
Notes: We report changes between years 2009-2008 and 2010-2009. 
Electricity consumption from IEA, GDP from World Bank. Data for 
the countries not included in our main analysis represented as 
squares. The value of  indicates the correlation coefficient. 
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S5: Detailed data and software 
 
In this section we report the detailed information on the data and software used in our analysis 
that, in order to preserve space, we omitted from the main manuscript.  
 
S5.1 Data sources and preparation 
 
Table S2: Detailed data sources 
 
Data Description  Source Web address 
Electricity 
load 
Hourly (or intra-hourly) day-
ahead electricity consumption. 
 
European 
Network of 
Transmission 
System 
Operators for 
Electricity 
(ENTSO-E) 
 
https://transparency.entsoe.
eu/ 
Temperature  For each nation we represent the 
overall profile of temperature by 
using as a proxy the daily average 
temperature in the country’s 
capital (the only exceptions are 
France / Bordeaux and Austria / 
Innsbruck because of data 
availability). The data is retrieved 
from the University of Dayton 
weather archive. Missing data are 
filled by collecting information 
for the same city from NOAA or 
Weather Underground, depending 
on availability. We control that 
temperature does not differ 
significantly across databases by 
running a linear regression on the 
overlapping data and accepting 
the alternative source only if the 
R2 > 0.85. We then use the OLS 
coefficients to impute missing 
values. 
 
University of 
Dayton 
 
National 
Oceanic and 
Atmospheric 
Administration 
(NOAA) 
 
Weather 
Underground 
http://academic.udayton.ed
u/kissock/http/Weather 
 
 
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov
/cdo-web/datatools  
 
 
https://www.wunderground
.com/  
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Share of 
residential 
load 
Share of annual electricity load 
consumed by the residential 
sector in 2017. 
International 
Energy Agency 
(IAE) 
https://www.iea.org/data-
and-statistics 
GDP 
changes  
GDP growth in the first and 
second quarter of 2020, relatively 
to the previous quarter. 
Organization 
for Economic 
Cooperation 
and 
Development 
(OECD) 
https://data.oecd.org/gdp/q
uarterly-gdp.htm 
Excess 
deaths 
Weekly excess death for each 
country in year 2020 compared 
with the average 2015-2019 are 
retrieved from the open source 
databased provide by The 
Economists, which download 
data from EuroMOMO. Excess 
deaths from Finland from 
Statistics Finland.   
 
The Economist 
 
European 
Monitoring of 
Excess 
Mortality for 
Public Health 
Action 
(EuroMOMO)  
 
Statistics 
Finland 
 
https://github.com/TheEco
nomist/covid-19-excess-
deaths-tracker 
 
 
 
https://www.euromomo.eu/ 
 
 
 
http://stat.fi/org/index_en.h
tml 
Policies Information on NPIs and 
lockdown 
Various online 
sources, for 
example (but 
not limited to) 
politico.eu 
 
https://www.politico.eu/arti
cle/europe-coronavirus-
post-lockdown-rules-
compared-face-mask-
travel/ 
 
 
 
S5.2 Software information 
 
As explained in the manuscript, we run our entire analysis in R (1). We use the packages lmtest 
(2), MASS (3), nlme (4) and sandwich (5). 
 
S5.3 Lockdown dates 
 
Lockdown polices varied significantly across countries. Since our focus is the economic impact of 
the pandemic, in order to provide a comparable analysis between different nations, we define as 
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the data starting the lockdown date the one in which the first NPIs (school closure, mobility 
restrictions, etc.) were introduced, and the date ending the lockdown the one in which all retail 
shops are allowed to re-open.  
 
Table S3: Lockdown dates used in our analysis 
Country 
Lockdown dates 
start end 
Austria 16 March 2020 01 May 2020 
Belgium 18 March 2020 11 May 2020 
Denmark 18 March 2020 11 May 2020 
France 17 March 2020 11 May 2020 
Germany 17 March 2020 06 May 2020 
Great Britain 26 March 2020 15 June 2020 
Italy  10 March 2020 04 May 2020 
Netherlands 15 March 2020 11 May 2020 
Norway 12 March 2020 11 May 2020 
Spain 14 March 2020 11 May 2020 
Sweden -- -- 
Switzerland 17 March 2020 11 May 2020 
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